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Article
Worldview Conflict in Daily Life
Mark J. Brandt1, Jarret T. Crawford2, and Daryl R. Van Tongeren3
Abstract
Building on laboratory- and survey-based research probing the psychology of ideology and the experience of worldview conflict,
we examined the association between worldview conflict and emotional reactions, psychological well-being, humanity esteem,
and political ideology in everyday life using experience sampling. In three combined samples (total N ¼ 328), experiencing dis-
agreement compared to agreement was associated with experiencing more other-condemning emotions, less well-being, and less
humanity esteem. There were no clear associations between experiencing disagreement and experiencing self-conscious emo-
tions, positive emotions, and mental stress. None of the relationships were moderated by political ideology. These results both
replicate and challenge findings from laboratory- and survey-based research, and we discuss possible reasons for the dis-
crepancies. Experience sampling methods can help researchers get a glimpse into everyday worldview conflict.
Keywords
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To understand everyday political behavior, we need to know
how people react to and interact with worldview-conflicting
people and information. In our roughly 16 waking hours, we
are bound to spend a fair portion of that time learning about the
world around us through media or in interactions with other
people. We might overhear by the coffee machine a conversa-
tion about the President’s recent executive order, or someone
might comment on the politics of our social media post. How
do these experiences, and the potential conflicts they engender,
influence our day-to-day emotions, psychological well-being,
and views of our fellow citizens?
Why Study Daily Life?
We examined how people experience worldview conflict in their
day-to-day lives, how people respond to these conflicts, and if
there are ideological differences in such responses. Studies have
examined how people interact with worldview-conflicting infor-
mation and people in survey studies (e.g., Crawford, 2014; Iyen-
gar & Westwood, 2015; Kahan, 2013) and lab experiments (e.g.,
Motyl, Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter, & Nosek, 2014; Taber & Lodge,
2006), but these studies present relatively extreme information
in the types of controlled settings necessary for identifying cau-
sal effects. Doing so potentially overstates the relationships, as
they naturally occur. For example, studies on motivated reason-
ing focus on political or religious issues that are most likely to
engage people’s psychological defense systems (Simons &
Green, in press; Taber & Lodge, 2006), relative to what one
might experience in everyday life.
Other studies have examined whether people seek out
worldview-consistent or worldview-conflicting information in
their social networks (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) or interact with
dissimilar others within these networks (Bakshy, Messing, &
Adamic, 2015; Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau,
2015). These data can catalog millions of interactions as people
interact naturally on social networks. However, they do not
capture more individualized information about participants,
nor their reactions to information they are exposed to or interact
with on these networks. Such studies are thus less ideal for ana-
lyzing psychological processes relative to those typically pos-
sible with lab and survey experiments.
Therefore, we followed a middle path and used experience
sampling methods (Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford, 2008) to
examine worldview conflict in daily life. This method com-
bines the spontaneity and realism of the online social networks
data with the precision of a survey study by contacting partici-
pants several times a day to report on their experiences and psy-
chological states. This technique does not have the causal
precision of experiments and relies on self-report data, but they
do capture participants in their natural environment, and the
self-report data do not suffer from the memory distortions that
can obfuscate data from survey studies (Shiffman et al., 2008).
To capture a breadth of worldview conflict in daily life, we
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focus our study on people’s experiences with and reactions to
both political and religious information. We examine both
simultaneously because political and religious attitudes often
overlap (Haynes, 2008; Johnson et al., 2016), and some of the
politically and religiously relevant experiences our participants
reported were characterized as both political and religious (e.g.,
terrorist attacks).
Hypothesis Development
Inspired by increasing levels of elite political polarization
(Fiorina & Abrams, 2008), research focuses on psychological
and behavioral consequences of worldview conflict—that is,
what happens when a person encounters attitudes and beha-
viors with which s/he disagrees? The short answer, it seems,
is that people feel negative emotions, have lower well-being,
have more stress and anxiety, and express more prejudice in
response to worldview-conflicting people and information. The
common underlying mechanism is that worldview-conflicting
information is experienced as aversive (Brandt, Reyna,
Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014; Byrne, 1969; Proulx,
Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012; Simons & Green, in press).
People even forgo money to avoid conflicting attitudes and
information (Frimer, Skitka, & Motyl, 2017). We examine how
this aversion to worldview-conflicting information plays out in
people’s daily lives.
Emotional reactions. Emotions signal whether a situation is
going well or not and can motivate future action (Frijda,
1988; Nelissen, Dijker, & de Vries, 2007). Worldview-
conflicting and worldview-consistent information elicit
strong negative and positive emotions, respectively. For
example, Democrats and Republicans expressed other-
condemning emotions like anger, hostility, and disgust after
learning that their party was going to lose an election, and
enthusiasm, hope, and pride after learning that their party
was going to win an election (Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe,
2015). People also experience strong other-condemning
emotions and moral outrage when moral values are violated
(Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014; Mullen &
Skitka, 2006; Tetlock, Kristel, Beth, Green, & Lerner,
2000) and positive emotions when moral values are upheld
(Hofmann et al., 2014; Skitka & Wisneski, 2011). In daily
life, other-condemning emotions (e.g., anger, disgust)
should follow worldview-conflicting information, and posi-
tive emotions (e.g., pride, enthusiasm) should follow
worldview-consistent information.
Psychological well-being. Other work has focused on decrements
in subjective well-being as an outcome of worldview conflict.
Subjective well-being consists of many components (Diener,
Shuh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999), including positive emotions and
a lack of negative emotions (such as those above), but the type
of well-being often studied in the worldview conflict literature
is happiness, life satisfaction, and meaning.1 Some studies find
that conservatives report greater well-being than liberals, but
more complete evidence shows that this is primarily the case
in contexts that are relatively conservative (Mandel & Omor-
ogbe, 2014; Motyl et al., 2014; Stavrova & Luhmann, 2016).
This is likely the case because people experience decrements
to well-being in contexts where they feel a lack of fit. For
example, being in a setting (e.g., university, neighborhood)
where people are likely to experience worldview conflict is
associated with lower levels of belongingness (Motyl et al.,
2014), a key component of psychological well-being (Baumeister
& Leary, 1995). Other studies find that worldview conflict can be
an active deterrent of psychological well-being—people report
feeling anxiety when they encounter disagreeable political
ideas (Simons & Green, in press), as well as lower levels of
happiness and meaning after encountering morally objection-
able behavior (Hofmann et al., 2014). These studies point to the
hypothesis that worldview conflict in daily life should lead to
decreases in psychological well-being and increases in stress
and anxiety.
Negative reactions toward others. People derogate others in
reaction to worldview conflict (Brandt et al., 2014; Craw-
ford, 2014). We investigate how derogation manifests as
lower levels of humanity esteem. Just as people can have
favorable views of the self (self-esteem) and the group (col-
lective esteem), humanity esteem is a favorable view of
humanity as a whole (Luke & Maoi, 2009). Lower levels
of humanity esteem may result from worldview conflict for
at least two reasons. First, humanity esteem appears to
develop, in part, as an extension of quality interpersonal
relationships (Luke, Maio, & Carnelley, 2004). Worldview
conflict may highlight how interpersonal relationships can
go wrong and reduce humanity esteem. Second, experien-
cing worldview conflict reminds people that others do not
agree with their worldview, and prompt them to reduce their
evaluations of people as a whole.
Will liberals and conservatives differ?. Worldview-conflict effects
may differ depending on political ideology. One example of
this ideological asymmetry hypothesis is from the motivated
social cognition perspective. It predicts that conservatives are
motivated by a desire to maintain cognitive closure (Jost, Gla-
ser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost & Krochik, 2014).
Worldview conflict strains the ability to achieve cognitive clo-
sure, and so political conservatives should show more negative
emotions, less positive emotions, poorer psychological well-
being, and less humanity esteem following worldview-
conflicting information than liberals. This prediction is also
consistent with the finding that political conservatives are par-
ticularly bothered by negative information and stimuli (nega-
tivity bias; Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014). Although this
work typically uses frightening (Oxley et al., 2008) or disgust-
ing (Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, & Hibbing, 2011) stimuli,
or angry faces (McLean et al., 2014), given the negativity asso-
ciated with worldview conflict (e.g., Simons & Green, in
press), this perspective should also predict that conservatives
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will show the largest effects when confronted with worldview
conflict.
An ideological symmetry hypothesis predicts that ideologi-
cal differences are less likely. The idea is that ideological dif-
ferences can and do emerge when using a limited range of
stimuli, but when using a broader array of stimuli that are more
likely to represent the range of stimuli people experience, these
differences disappear (e.g., Brandt et al., 2014; Brandt &
Wagemans, in press; Conway et al., 2016; Crawford, 2012;
Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka, 2010). For example, sometimes it
appears that conservatives are more prejudiced than liberals,
but when using a broad range of groups, it’s clear that both lib-
erals and conservatives express similar levels of prejudice
toward worldview-violating groups (Brandt et al., 2014). In
short, the idea is that both liberals and conservatives have a
similar cognitive architecture for facing worldview-
conflicting information and experiences.
The Current Study
We explored how people experience worldview-conflicting
information in daily life across emotional reactions, psycholo-
gical well-being, and humanity esteem. Participants from three
populations were contacted several times a day to report their
experience with political and religious information, along with
their current psychological states. For psychological well-being
and humanity esteem, we also included baseline assessments so
that our analyses could test whether worldview-conflicting
information is associated with changes from baseline.
Method
Participants
We collected data from three locations. Hope College (HC) and
The College of New Jersey (TCNJ) are in the United States,
and Tilburg University (TiU) is in the Netherlands. TCNJ and
TiU are public institutions, and HC is a private, religious insti-
tution. Both HC (N ¼ 113; 39 men, 72 women, 2 missing val-
ues, Mage ¼ 19, SDage ¼ .96) and TCNJ (N ¼ 100; 30 men, 66
women, 4 missing values, Mage ¼ 20, SDage ¼ 2.49) used stu-
dent samples, and TiU (N ¼ 115; 50 men, 45 women, 20 miss-
ing, Mage ¼ 24, SDage ¼ 9.51) used a mix of students and
members of the community.2,3
Procedure and Measures
Intake survey. After a smartphone compatibility check and
informed consent, participants completed an intake survey with
demographic, political, religious, and individual difference
measures.4 Here we used two measures from the intake survey.
We measured political ideology with 3 items about partici-
pants’ social, economic, and foreign policy ideology on a
1–7 scale. In the U.S. samples, the scale anchors and items
referred to liberal and conservative positions. In the Dutch sam-
ple, the scale anchors and items referred to left-wing and right-
wing positions. The scale was reliable (a ¼ .86). The items
were averaged, rescaled to range from 0 to 1, and centered
on their midpoint (i.e., “moderate”). The measure spanned the
possible range of the scale, with the mean near the midpoint
(M ¼ .03).
We measured baseline levels of humanity esteem with two
face-valid items from the Humanity Esteem Scale (Luke &
Maio, 2009), a construct assessing people’s positive evalua-
tions for people in general. The 2 items were “I take a positive
attitude toward humanity” and “At times, I think that human
beings are no good at all” (reverse scored). In the U.S. samples,
the scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree), and in the Dutch sample, the scale ranged from 3
(strongly disagree) to þ3 (strongly agree). To equate the range
of the items so that analyses can be combined, the items were
rescaled to range from 0 to 1 and then averaged (r ¼ .34).
Signal survey. The day after participants completed the intake
survey, the experience sampling phase started. For 3 days,
between 9 a.m. and 9 p.m., participants were signaled on their
smartphones via Short Message Service (SMS) text message
using SurveySignal (Hofmann & Patel, 2015). The SMS mes-
sage included a link to an online questionnaire optimized for
mobile devices. Each day, participants were signaled 5 times
at random intervals, with the stipulation that no signal would
be within 1 hr of the previous signal (overall response rate ¼
73%, SD ¼ 24%; HC ¼ 65%, SD ¼ 25%; TCNJ ¼ 78%, SD
¼ 21%; TiU ¼ 76%, SD ¼ 24%; 3,593 completed signals in
total). The signal was considered missed if participants did not
respond within 1 hr. Responses were incentivized by treating
each response as an entry into a raffle for one of three gift cards
(US$50 or €50 in the HC and TiU samples, US$25 in the TCNJ
sample) to a major online retailer (Amazon.com or Bol.com).
Given the frequency with which signals were sent, the design
necessarily required brief measures.
At each signal, participants were asked whether they dis-
cussed political/religious issues and events with a person or
group (political n ¼ 169 [4.7% of signals], religious n ¼ 129
[3.6%]), learned about political/religious issues, and events
without contributing (political n ¼ 231 [6.4%], religious
n ¼ 90 [2.5%]), or none of the above (n ¼ 2,974 [82.8% of
signals]) in the last hour. Many participants reported just one
or two relevant (i.e., not “none of the above”) events (M¼ 1.9,
SD ¼ 1.8, range [0, 13]). If they selected none of the above,
they completed an abbreviated survey used to compute base-
line levels of well-being (see below). If they selected one of
the other options, the participants completed additional mea-
sures about the event. In this report, we focused on the psy-
chological reactions surrounding perceived worldview
conflict and disagreement.
Worldview conflict was operationalized as disagreement.
We used 2 items to assess participants’ agreement (reverse
scored) and disagreement with the event (“To what extent did
you agree/disagree with what you discussed/learned about”;
0 ¼ not at all, 100 ¼ very much). They were correlated
(r ¼ .68), rescaled to range from 0 to 1, and averaged to create
a scale. The scale ranges from complete event agreement (low
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scores) to event disagreement (high scores), and we call it event
disagreement to highlight that higher scores represent more
disagreement with a discrete event. The mean (M ¼ .40,
SD ¼ .30) was lower than the midpoint, suggesting people
reported situations characterized by more agreement than dis-
agreement, which is consistent with selective exposure
research (Freedman & Sears, 1965). Responses spanned the
theoretical range of the scale and did not suffer from skewness
(.51) or kurtosis (.69).
Our investigation is centered on event disagreement, and
this is our primary predictor variable. Because many partici-
pants report more than one event, we can unconfound event
disagreement from the tendency for some people to be more
likely to see more disagreement or agreement in general.
We created a covariate that assesses overall disagreement
by averaging across event disagreement (the measure
described in the previous paragraph) for each participant. This
allows us to estimate the effect of perceived event disagree-
ment over and above a participant’s tendency to report more
or less disagreement overall.
We measured participants’ discrete moral emotions in the
moment (Haidt, 2003; Hofmann et al., 2014). Following
Haidt’s (2003) categorization, we averaged anger, contempt,
and disgust to represent other-condemning emotions
(a¼ .83; cf., Huddy et al., 2015), and averaged shame and guilt
to represent self-conscious negative emotions (r ¼ .43;
cf. Tangney, 2003).5 We averaged pride, gratitude, and eleva-
tion to represent positive emotions (a ¼ .58). Each emotion
was measured on a 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much) scale and
was rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Although we believe that
the mental stress and well-being scales capture relevant theo-
retical dimensions, we recognize that others may prefer other
combinations. For this reason, we also report results for each
item individually.
We assessed multiple state-level indicators of psychologi-
cal well-being. The measure we call well-being was measured
with items (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2014) assessing happiness
(“How happy do you feel at the moment?”), purpose (“Do you
feel that your life has a clear sense of purpose at the
moment?”), and life satisfaction (“How satisfied with life are
you at the moment?”), each measured from not at all to very
much. In the U.S. samples, the scale ranged from 0 to 4; and in
the Dutch sample, the scale ranged from 0 to 6. To equate the
range of the items so that analyses can be combined, items
were all rescaled to range from 0 to 1 and then averaged to
form a well-being measure (a ¼ .75).
We called our other measure of psychological well-being
mental stress, which was measured with items assessing
mental exhaustion (“How mentally exhausted are you at
the moment?”) and stress (“How stressed are you at the
moment?”), each measured on a scale from not at all to very
much. In the U.S. samples, the scale ranged from 0 to 4, and
in the Dutch sample, the scale ranged from 0 to 6. Items were
all rescaled to range from 0 to 1 and averaged to form a mental
stress measure (r ¼ .68). Although we believe that the mental
stress and well-being scales capture relevant theoretical
dimensions, we recognize that others may prefer other combi-
nations. For this reason, we also report results for each
item individually.
One item assessed humanity esteem (Luke & Maio, 2009).
This item read “I have a positive attitude toward humanity” and
was measured on a scale from 3 (strongly disagree) to þ3
(strongly agree). The item was rescaled to range from 0 to 1.
There were also cases where participants reported no polit-
ically or religiously relevant event and instead selected “none
of the above” at the beginning of the survey signals. In these
instances, participants completed the items assessing psycho-
logical well-being and mental stress described above. These
responses formed baseline indicators of well-being and men-




The observations are clustered within persons. To account for
the nonindependence of the observations, data were analyzed
using regression analyses with clustered standard errors in
SPSS Version 22. The coefficients can be interpreted like ordi-
nary least squares regression coefficients. Although multilevel
modeling is ideal, the data are too sparse within individuals
(i.e., some participants only report one relevant event) to reli-
ably estimate these more complex models. For each outcome
variable, we estimate several models. As the most basic test,
Model 1 only includes mean-centered event disagreement as
a predictor of the outcome variables. To isolate the estimate for
a participant’s perceived event disagreement with discrete
events from a participants’ overall disagreement across events,
Model 2 includes mean-centered event disagreement and
mean-centered overall disagreement as predictors. Model 3 is
the same as Model 2 with the addition of covariates to
adjust for the influence of event perspective (type contrast: dis-
cussed ¼ .5, learned about ¼ .5; content contrast: politics ¼
.5, religion ¼ .5; and the interaction between these two
codes), sample (Contrast 1: HC ¼ .25, TCNJ ¼ .25, and
TiU ¼ .5; Contrast 2: HC ¼ .5, TCNJ ¼ .5, and TiU ¼
0), and demographics information (mean-centered age; gender
contrast code: women ¼ .5, men ¼ .5). The last two models
test if political ideology moderates the effects of event dis-
agreement, both with and without covariates. Model 4 is the
same as Model 2 but includes midpoint-centered ideology and
its interaction with mean-centered event disagreement. Model
5 is the same as Model 4 but includes the covariates.
We included baseline measures of well-being, mental stress,
and humanity esteem when they were used as outcome vari-
ables. As noted in the Method section, all measures were
rescaled so that their original scaling (e.g., 0–6) ranged from
0 to 1. Coefficients can be interpreted as the percent difference
in the outcome variable as one goes from the theoretical mini-
mum to the theoretical maximum of the predictor variable (see
Baguley, 2009, for the benefits of unstandardized effect sizes).
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Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the key vari-
ables are in Tables 1 and 2.
Hypothesis Testing
Models 1, 2, and 3 test the main effect of event disagreement on
the outcome variables, after accounting for overall disagree-
ment and other covariates. Across all three models, more event
disagreement was associated with more other-condemning
emotions, lower well-being, and lower humanity esteem
(Table 3; Models 1–3). The effect for other-condemning emo-
tions was the most substantial (Model 3: b¼ .18), and the effect
for well-being was the weakest (Model 3: b ¼ .06), with the
effect on humanity esteem falling in the middle (Model 3: b ¼
.12). Event disagreement was also related to more self-
conscious emotions and lower positive emotions in Model 1,
but the confidence intervals (CIs) for the effects encompassed
zero after including the covariates in Models 2 and 3 (see
Table 3). In short, the results were consistent with expectations
for other-condemning emotions, well-being, and humanity
esteem but were not consistent with expectations for self-
conscious emotions, positive emotions, and mental stress.
We also examined the effect of event disagreement on indi-
vidual items. The conclusions based on these single items were
largely the same as for the larger scales. There are exceptions.
It appears that the negative relationship between event dis-
agreement and well-being is driven by the happiness item;
event disagreement was associated with less happiness in
Table 1. Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Event Disagreement, Ideology, and the Outcome Variables.
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Event disagreement
2. Ideology .03
3. Other-condemning emotions .21*** .09*
4. Self-conscious emotions .15** .0001 .51***
5. Positive emotions .15*** .08 .23*** .25***
6. Well-being .10* .10 .03 .05 .32***
7. Mental stress .07 .02 .25*** .07 .22*** .12**
8. Humanity esteem .20*** .07 .21*** .15*** .20*** .36*** .02
M .001 .07 .28 .16 .37 .64 .48 .72
SD .30 .22 .28 .22 .27 .20 .29 .24
Note. Event disagreement is mean centered. Ideology is midpoint centered. Event disagreement is participants’ disagreement (compared to agreement) with dis-
crete events. All variables rescaled to range from 0 to 1.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 2. Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Event Disagreement, Ideology, and the Individual Items.




3. Anger .23*** .10
4. Disgust .26*** .14** .83***
5. Contempt .16*** .01 .48*** .50***
6. Guilt .17*** .01 .45*** .42*** .49***
7. Shame .07 .02 .35*** .35*** .35*** .43***
8. Grateful .23*** .13** .08 .08 .09 .02 .10
9. Pride .02 .07 .33*** .27*** .45*** .24*** .18*** .39***
10. Elevation .10* .01 .11* .08 .13** .18*** .21*** .36*** .17***
11. Happy .11* .05 19*** .17*** .06 .07 .10 .20*** .08 .20***
12. Life
satisfaction
.07 .05 .08 .02 .06 .08 .03 .13** .07 .24*** .55***
13. Meaning .08 .003 .02 .01 .09 .12* .03 .28*** .19*** .31*** .46*** .50***
14. Mentally
exhausted
.11* .05 .23*** .21*** .10* .001 .09 .14** .10* .07 .18** .11** .03
15. Stress .03 .01 .29*** .28*** .12* .01 .20*** .26*** .23*** .11* .21*** .13** .05 .68***
M .001 .03 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.18 0.12 0.41 0.30 0.34 0.62 0.68 0.61 0.53 0.44
SD .30 .22 .32 .33 .32 .27 .24 .36 .33 .33 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.31 0.33
Note. Event disagreement is mean centered. Ideology is midpoint centered. Event disagreement is participants’ disagreement (compared to agreement) with dis-
crete events. All variables rescaled to range from 0 to 1.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Models 2 and 3 (the models with covariates; Model 3: b ¼
.14), whereas there was no clear associations between event
disagreement and the remaining items measuring well-being
(Life Satisfaction Model 3: b ¼ .04, Meaning Model 3:
b ¼ .004). A similar exception occurred for the gratitude and
elevation items: Event disagreement was associated with less
gratitude and elevation in Models 1, 2, and 3 (it was not dif-
ferent from zero for elevation, but the size and direction of
the effect were similar to gratitude), but event disagreement
was not clearly associated with the overall positive emotions
scale and the coefficient for the pride item was estimated in
the opposite direction.
Does political ideology moderate the association between
event disagreement and the outcome variables? The ideological
asymmetry hypothesis predicts that the effect of event dis-
agreement will be larger for conservatives than for liberals
(an Event Disagreement  Ideology interaction), whereas the
ideological symmetry hypothesis predicts that liberals and
conservatives would be more alike than different (No Event
Disagreement  Ideology interaction).
Models 4 and 5 tested the potential interaction between
event disagreement and ideology (see last two columns of
Table 3). In all 38 tests, the 95% CI included zero. This pro-
vides no evidence that political liberals and conservatives have
different responses to event disagreement. Moreover, the
direction of the interaction coefficient was often in the opposite
direction of what would be predicted by an ideological asym-
metry perspective. For example, the (nonsignificant) interac-
tion term for other-condemning emotions suggests that for
more conservative participants, the effect of event disagree-
ment is weaker than it is for liberal participants; the coefficient
does not point in the direction predicted by the ideological
asymmetry hypothesis. Notably, in many cases, the CIs for the
tests were quite large. This means that we also cannot draw
firm conclusions about the effect being near zero as the ideolo-
gical symmetry hypothesis predicts.
Discussion
We tested how worldview-consistent and worldview-
conflicting experiences in daily lives, as operationalized by
perceived disagreement with discrete events, are associated
with emotions, psychological well-being, and humanity
esteem. Perceived event disagreement was associated with
stronger other-condemning emotional reactions, with less
well-being, and with less humanity esteem. Perceived event
disagreement was not clearly associated with indicators of
self-conscious emotions, positive emotions, or mental stress.
There was no evidence that participants’ political ideology
moderated any of these findings. These results confirm
Table 3. Unstandardized Coefficients and 95% Confidence Intervals From Models Assessing the Link Between Event Disagreement (Models 1–3)
and Event Disagreement  Ideology (Models 4 and 5) and the Outcome Variables.
Event Disagreement Event Disagreement  Ideology
b [95% CI] b [95% CI]
Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Other-condemning emotions .28 [.24, .31] .17 [.05, .28] .18 [.06, .30] .30 [.86, .25] .15 [.08, .30]
Anger .24 [.13, .36] .21 [.09, .33] .25 [.13, .37] .44 [1.12, .24] .31 [1.00, .37]
Disgust .28 [.15, .41] .21 [.06, .36] .23 [.08, .38] .62 [.11, .32] .43 [1.14, .27]
Contempt .16 [.03, .30] .17 [.01, .35] .17 [.04, .38] .09 [.89, .71] .04 [.77, .85]
Self-conscious emotions .11 [.02, .20] .07 [.04, .18] .08 [.04, .21] .05 [.44, .54] .09 [.45, .62]
Shame .05 [.05, .14] .04 [.09, .16] .06 [.08, .20] .04 [.49, .57] .17 [.37, .71]
Guilt .15 [.04, .27] .10 [.03, .23] .13 [.02, .27] .04 [.59, .68] .01 [.67, .65]
Positive emotions .14 [.22, .06] .07 [.17, .04] .06 [.17, .06] .07 [.42, .29] .11 [.26, .48]
Grateful .28 [.38, .17] .20 [.33, .07] .16 [.30, .02] .33 [.23, .90] .55 [.02, 1.11]
Pride .02 [.16, .11] .12 [.07, .30] .12 [.10, .33] .20 [.88, .48] .12 [.89, .64]
Elevation .10 [.23, .02] .13 [.28, .02] .13 [.28, .02] .39 [.10, .26] .17 [.79, .45]
Well-being .04 [.08, .01] .06 [.11, .01] .06 [.11, .01] .10 [.34, .14] .14 [.40, .11]
Happy .06 [.09, .03] .13 [.19, .07] .14 [.21, .08] .12 [.31, .08] .13 [.35, .09]
Life satisfaction .02 [.05, .01] .04 [.11, .03] .04 [.11, .04] .06 [.26, .14] .07 [.28, .15]
Meaning .0001 [.03, .03] .001 [.07, .07] .004 [.08, .07] .09 [.28, .11] .11 [.31, .10]
Mental stress .02 [.05, .08] .02 [.05, .09] .01 [.06, .08] .06 [.40, .27] .03 [.31, .37]
Mentally exhausted .02 [.02, .06] .05 [.03, .14] .04 [.05, .14] .10 [.10, .30] .14 [.07, .36]
Stress .03 [.02, .07] .06 [.03, .14] .04 [.06, .14] .04 [.17, .24] .06 [.17, .29]
Humanity esteem .12 [.21, .04] .12 [.24, .004] .12 [.24, .002] .02 [.45, .42] .05 [.40, .50]
Includes overall disagreement? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Includes covariates? No No Yes No Yes
Note. Event disagreement is participants’ disagreement (compared to agreement) with discrete events. Overall disagreement is participants’ general tendency to
report disagreement. Italicized coefficients highlight coefficients whose 95% CIs do not include zero. Covariates include contrast-coded indicators of the event
perspective (and the interaction between these two codes), sample, gender, and age (mean-centered). For well-being, mental stress, and humanity esteem, the
models also include baseline estimates of the outcome variable. CI ¼ confidence interval.
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research on other-condemning emotional reactions to
worldview-conflicting information (Hofmann et al., 2014;
Huddy et al., 2015), worldview-inconsistent experiences and
their deleterious effects on well-being (Motyl et al., 2014), and
ideological similarities in worldview conflict–related processes
(Brandt et al., 2014; Taber & Lodge, 2006). It did not confirm
research linking positive emotional reactions (Huddy et al.,
2015) to worldview-consistent information. Nor did it confirm
research on ideological differences in emotion and information
processing in response to worldview-inconsistent information
(Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2003).
In the domains where our results are consistent with past
work, the interpretation is straightforward: In the relative mes-
siness of daily experiences, the effects observed in laboratory
and survey studies conceptually replicate in our study of every-
day worldview conflict. Although this research needs to be
replicated with more representative samples and over longer
periods of time, researchers should have increased confidence
in the theoretical findings that we conceptually replicated.
Clear conclusions are difficult for the results that failed to
conceptually replicate prior work. There are at least four
explanations. First, the size and composition of our samples
may not be ideal for detecting the effects of worldview con-
flict on positive emotions and mental stress or the moderating
role of ideology. Second, our measures may not have captured
the relevant aspects of positive emotions and mental stress.
We did not find clear effects on positive emotions, but there
was a consistent effect on the single item measuring gratitude
(and to a lesser extent, elevation). Perhaps pride functions dif-
ferently when it comes to worldview threat? We also did not
find consistent effects on mental stress, neither on the overall
measure nor on the individual items. Perhaps people are inac-
curately self-reporting their own stress and that less obtrusive
measures will reveal the impact of worldview conflict on
mental stress?
Third, the time between the worldview-conflicting experi-
ence and the measures of mental stress was close. We exam-
ined discrete instances of worldview conflict and their impact
on immediate feelings of mental stress. Although this could
exacerbate the effect (e.g., due to consistency pressures), per-
haps the link between worldview conflict and mental stress is
a cumulative process. Future studies with longitudinal
follow-up questionnaires could test if people who report more
worldview conflict have increased mental stress at later times.
Fourth, our study included a variety of experiences that peo-
ple encountered throughout their day. These stimuli are more
representative of people’s daily experiences than typically used
stimuli. Although theories of political ideology make domain
general predictions (Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost & Krochik,
2014), the typical study only uses a relatively narrow range
of stimuli. Findings using a narrow range of stimuli may
not generalize to studies that use broader ranges of stimuli
(cf. Brandt & Wagemans, in press). The lack of any ideological
differences in our study casts doubt on the domain generality
ideology effects. However, it is also possible that ideological
differences in cognition and motivation are subtle and that
these subtleties are not easily observed in daily behavior (but
see Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008).
Limitations
Although our method has strengths, our data are limited in
other ways. Our design precludes causal inferences, although
the inclusion of baseline measures for some outcome variables
helps to provide greater estimate precision. Future work may
consider longitudinal components of greater duration. More-
over, as mentioned above, our sample was not representative
of the broader population; rather, it mostly consisted of
college-aged adults. Finally, we used abbreviated measures to
maintain short surveys. Although we tried to choose items and
measures that were used in the past and have face validity, lon-
ger measures may better capture the nuances of these con-
structs and might reveal equally nuanced results. The
difference between gratitude, elevation, and pride—our indica-
tors of positive emotions—speaks to this possibility.
When reflecting on our most damning results (Vazire,
2016), those that cut against our conclusions, we identified two
with an approximately equal level of damnation. Damning
Result #1: We make claims about worldview conflict in
response to politically and religiously relevant events in daily
life, but overall people reported having very few experiences
with these types of events. Such a finding is consistent with
political scientists’ conclusion that most citizens are not avid
consumers of politics (Carpini, 2005), but it also suggests our
findings will not necessarily generalize to people who do not
naturally experience these types of worldview-conflicting
events on their own. Damning Result #2: We make claims
about the lack of a moderating effect of political ideology;
however, our CIs for these effect estimates are wide. This
makes it difficult to come to clear conclusion about the precise
size of these effects beyond the conclusion that they are not dif-
ferent from zero in our study.
Conclusion
Social scientists are encouraged to seek support for lab- and
survey-based research findings in daily or “real-world” set-
tings. We studied the implications of worldview conflict on
outcomes that have commanded attention in lab- and
survey-based approaches: emotional reactions, psychological
well-being, and negative evaluations of others (i.e., lower
humanity esteem). The results suggest that the other-
condemning emotional reactions, decrements in well-being,
and negative reactions to others after experiencing conflict
are not only experienced in the lab, but in people’s daily lives,
whereas evidence for positive emotional reactions to agree-
ment and ideological differences in any of these conflict-
based outcomes are less clear in day-to-day experiences. Our
findings are just one step toward understanding people’s
experience of worldview conflict in daily life. We hope this
article encourages others to take additional steps to explore
these important experiences.
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Notes
1. When subjective well-being is operationalized in terms of emo-
tions, it considers a broad range of positive and negative emotions
(e.g., the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule [PANAS]). The
emotions we measures are more precise clusters—such as other-
condemning negative emotions (e.g., anger, hostility, and disgust;
Haidt, 2003)—that share appraisals beyond valence.
2. Tilburg’s intake survey had higher rates of missing data. After the
smartphone sign up, participants needed to click “proceed” to con-
tinue to the intake, but this was not always clear to participants.
3. We aimed to collect 150 participants per sample, or until data col-
lection termination for logistical reasons (e.g., end of semester).
One hundred and fifty participants gives power of .80 to detect
an r of .25 in each of the individual samples and .80 power to detect
an r of .14 when the samples are combined. With our achieved sam-
ple size, we had .80 power to detect an r of .16.
4. A list of measures included in the baseline and the signal surveys
are in the supplemental online materials.
5. We included embarrassment in the U.S. samples but excluded it
from analyses because there is no sufficient Dutch translation of
this emotion.
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